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THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT AND
UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS: LOCAL 512 V. NLRB
AFTER THE IMMIGRATION REFORM AND
CONTROL ACT OF 1986.
In Local 512 v. NLRB, 1 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) to award backpay to
undocumented workers who had been unlawfully laid off by their employer. The court decided Local 512 before enactment of the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). 2 One of the aims of the IRCA is to
keep undocumented aliens out of the workplace by making it illegal to
knowingly employ undocumented aliens. 3 Because protection of undocumented workers like that granted in Local 512 might undermine pursuit of
this IRCA objective, apparent conflict arises between National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA)4 and IRCA objectives regarding undocumented
workers. This apparent conflict merits careful consideration.
This Comment focuses on how the NLRB should resolve conflicts
between NLRA and IRCA workplace objectives. It begins by discussing
the scope of the Board's discretion to fashion remedies for unfair labor
practices and the limitation imposed on that discretion by the requirement
that remedial orders accommodate non-NLRA statutory objectives. Next,
the Comment summarizes pre-IRCA treatment of undocumented workers
under the NLRA. The Local 512 decision and the employer sanctions
provisions of the IRCA are then described. The Comment suggests that the
Local 512 court reached the correct result. Nevertheless, Local 512 gives
the Board little guidance regarding how it should treat non-NLRA objectives such as those of the IRCA. Accordingly, a proposal for clarifying the
NLRB's duty to accommodate non-NLRA objectives in its remedial orders
is presented. The Comment then examines whether, consistent with this
duty, the NLRB could award reinstatement and backpay to an undocumented worker given the employer sanctions provisions of the IRCA.
Finally, pertinent general policy considerations are taken into account. The
Comment concludes that an NLRB reinstatement and backpay order for
unlawfully discharged undocumented workers would not, under most
circumstances, impermissibly fail to accommodate IRCA objectives.
1. 795 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1986).
2. Act of November 5, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100
Stat, 3358) 10A. Local 512 was decided July 23, 1986. President Reagan signed the IRCA into law on

November 6, 1986.
3. See H.R. REP. No. 1000, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 45-46 (1986), reprintedin 10C U.S. CODE CONO.
& ADMIN. NEws 5649 (1986). The employer sanctions provisions of the IRCA ultimately aim at the
deterrence of illegal immigration to this country. The Act's supporters cited employment opportunity as
providing the primary impetus to cross the border illegally. Thus, they expect that decreasing employment opportunities for unauthorized aliens should deter illegal immigration. Id.
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1982).
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I.

BACKGROUND

A.

NLRB Remedial Discretion and the Duty to Accommodate NonNLRA Objectives

Congress enacted the NLRA in 1935. 5 The Act's primary objective is to
preserve industrial peace through promotion of the collective bargaining
process. 6 Congress established the NLRB to pursue NLRA objectives by
discouraging unfair labor practices. 7 The Board discourages unfair labor
practices primarily by issuing remedial orders. 8 The Board generally
should remedy unfair labor practices involving improper discharge by
ordering that discharged employees be reinstated with backpay. 9
5. Id.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). Congress determined that effective collective bargaining could be
achieved by "protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing." Id.
7. Id. § 153. Unfair labor practices include employer interference with employee organizational
rights guaranteed by § 8 of the Act. Id. § 158. Only "employees" are protected from unfair labor
practices. ld. § 151. The Board determines who is an employee for purposes ofthe Act. NLRB v. Hearst
Publishing Co., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944).
The Supreme Court has held that the Board has broad authority to combat unfair labor practices. See
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245-46 (1959). Accordingly, the Court has
determined that the Board has primary jurisdiction over claims arguably involving unfair labor
practices, id. at 244-45, unless a claim alleges breach of a collective bargaining agreement, Smith v.
Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 196-97 (1962), or breach of a union's duty of fair representation,
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 181 (1967).
8. The Board's authority to remedy unfair labor practices is granted by NLRA § 10(c), 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(c). United Steelworkers of Am. v. NLRB, 646 F.2d 616,629 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Section 10(c) reads
in part:
If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the opinion that any person
named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the
Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on such person an order
requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practices, and to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the
policies of this subchapter ....
Courts have removed the Board's authority to remedy unfair laborpractices in some instances. Generally, these instances occur when employees seek NLRA protection from unfair labor practices that the
employees have protested in an unlawful manner or for an unlawful purpose. See NLRB v. Drivers Local
Union 639,362 U.S. 274,281(1960). Accordingly, ifemployee protests involveconduct that contravenes
clearly applicable federal or state criminal and tort law, the employees may lose NLRA protection. R.
GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW; UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 311 (1976). A strike

constitutes unprotected activity when participants unlawfully seize an employer's property, NLRB v.
Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 252 (1939), or when strikers use deliberate or reckless
falsehoods to further theirgoals, Montefiore Hosp. &Medical Center v. NLRB, 621 F.2d510,517 (2dCir.
1980). The Board also may not protect employees who act "irresponsibl[y]" in so timing a protest that a
risk of injury to the employer's physical plant or equipment is created. See NLRB v. Marshall Car Wheel
& Foundry Co., 218 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1955); see alsoMontefiore Hospital,621 F.2d at 515.
9. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187-88 (1941). The Board may order reinstatement
without backpay or backpay without reinstatement. Indianapolis Power& Light Co. v. NLRB, 122 F.2d
757, 763 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 804 (1942). A backpay award should compensate a
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The NLRA and Undocumented Workers
The Board has broad remedial discretion, limited primarily by the

principle that a remedial order must effectuate NLRA objectives. 10 In
Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 11 the Supreme Court further limited the
Board's remedial discretion. The Southern Steamship Court imposed a
duty on the Board to "accommodate" the objectives of statutory schemes
other than those of the NLRA when making a remedial order.12 The extent
of this restriction on Board discretion, however, is unclear. The Court set
out no precise guidelines indicating how and to what extent the Board
should accommodate non-NLRA objectives.
The Supreme Court, however, has indicated that Southern Steamship's
restriction on Board discretion should be interpreted narrowly, 13 and lower
courts have consistently done so. 14 Southern Steamship'snarrow reading is
discriminatee for wages actually lost because of an unlawful discharge. NLRB v. Columbia Tribune
Publishing Co., 495 F.2d 1384, 1392 (8th Cir. 1974). Interest may be added to a backpay award. Isis
Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 716 (1962), enf.deniedon different grounds, 322 F.2d 913 (9th
Cir. 1963); see alsoBagel Bakers Council v. NLRB, 555 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir. 1977). A remedial award
must not be punitive. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 9-12 (1940). The Court in Sure-Tan v.
NLRB, 467 U.S. 883,900-01 (1984), equated a speculative award with apunitive award. Thus, an award
redressing losses which may never occur is probably not enforceable.
10. Virginia Elec. &Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533,540 (1943); see also UnitedSteelworkers,
646 F.2d at 629. The Board may choose not to exercise its authority to remedy unfair labor practices by
deferring to an arbitrator's remedial determination. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984).
11. 316U.S.31(1942).
12. The Court stated:
[Tihe Board has not been commissioned to effectuate the policies of the Labor Relations Act so
single-mindedly that it may wholly ignore other and equally important Congressional objectives.
Frequently the entire scope of Congressional purpose calls for the careful accommodation of one
statutory scheme to another, and it is not too much to demand of an administrative body that it
undertake this accommodation without excessive emphasis upon its immediate task.
Id. at47.
At issue in SouthernSteamship was the propriety of an NLRB order reinstating several shipping line
employees who had struck their employer in a manner apparently constituting a criminal violation of the
Mutiny Act. The Court stated, "We cannot ignore the fact that the strike was unlawful from its very
inception." Id. at 48. Southern Steamship was a 5-4 decision. The dissenters would have upheld the
Board's reinstatement order "We can see nojustification for an iron rule that a discharge ofa strikerby his
employer for some particular, unlawful conduct. . . is sufficient to bar his reinstatement as a matter of
law." Id. at51.
13. See Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 111 (1958). The Court has
otherwise offered little guidance to the Board regarding what its duty of accommodation encompasses.
However, some members ofthe Courthave indicated thatSouthernSteamship atleast imposes adutyon an
agency to consider relevant statutes which are not part of the statutory or regulatory scheme which the
agency is charged with enforcing. See Community Television v. Gottfried, 459 U.S. 508, 517 (1983)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
14. See, e.g., SchmerlerFord, Inc. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 1335,1339-40(7th Cir. 1970) (roleofunionin
allegedly fostering price-fixing scheme in violation of Sherman Act does not disqualify it from acting as
employees' bargaining agent); NLRB v. Globe Wireless, Ltd., 193 F.2d 748, 751 (9th Cir. 1951) (NLRB
may order reinstatement of employees who conducted a strike which, although not illegal in itself, resulted in noncompliance with provisions of the Federal Communications Act).
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appropriate since the case involved a unique set of facts. 15 The Southern
Steamship Court considered whether a strike conducted on board a ship
away from home port and in violation of the Mutiny Act constituted
protected NLRA activity. 16
The Board has not allowed Southern Steamship to greatly restrict its
remedial powers. The Board has often made orders which contravene other
statutory or regulatory objectives. For example, the Board has determined
that a bankruptcy court may not extinguish backpay liability assessed
against an employer by the Board. 17 The Board has also awarded reinstatement and backpay to an employee who had been working for a liquor
retailer in contravention of a municipal ordinance prohibiting persons
under twenty-one years of age from so doing. 18
B.

Undocumented Workers and the NLRA

In Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 19 the Supreme Court considered whether the
Board's duty to accommodate non-NLRA objectives required it to consider
a discriminatee's immigration status in devising a remedy. 20 The Court
vacated a Seventh Circuit decision that enforced a backpay award to
undocumented workers 21 who had left the country after the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) commenced an investigation into their
15. The court in Globe Wireless stated that Southern Steamship's facts were such that the case
"stands in a class by itself." 193 F.2d at 751.
16. SouthernSteamship, 316 U.S. at47.
17. International Technical Prods. Corp., 249 N.L.R.B. 1301(1980).
18. New Foodland, Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. 418 (1973).
19. 467 U.S. 883 (1984).
20. BeforeSure-Tan, the Board had consistently deemed undocumented workers to beemployees for
the purposes of the NLRA and thereby entitled to the Act's protections. See Amay's Bakery & Noodle
Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 214 (1976); Handbilling Equip. Corp., 209 N.L.R.B. 64, 65 (1974); Lawrence
Rigging, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 1094, 1095 (1973). However, the Board had issued inconsistent decisions
regarding whether a discriminatee's immigration status should bear on a remedy determination. Compare
Amay's Bakery & Noodle Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 214, 220 (1976) (accommodation principles preclude
unconditional reinstatement order for undocumented workers in view of state law prohibiting employment of those not lawful residents) with Apollo Tire Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 1627 (1978) (undocumented
status of discriminatees has no bearing on discriminatees' entitlement to a reinstatement award). Judicial
approval of the Board's decision that undocumented workers are entitled to NLRA protections first came
in Sure-Tan v. NLRB, 583 E2d 355 (7th Cir. 1979), reh'g after remand, 672 F.2d 592 (7th Cir. 1982),
aff'd inpart,reversedinpart, 467 U.S. 883 (1984), andNLRB v. ApolloTireCo., 604F.2d 1180 (9thCir.
1979).
A Board award of reinstatement and backpay to an unlawfully discharged undocumented worker
provided for conflict with immigration concerns even before enactment of the IRCA. This is because an
NLRB reinstatement and backpay award to an undocumented worker could be seen as tacit sanction for
the continued unlawful presence of that worker in the United States.
21. For purposes of this Comment, "undocumented workers" refers to individuals not lawfully
authorized to work in the United States. "Undocumented aliens" refers to individuals present in the
United States in violation of8 U.S.C. § 1181 (1982).

The NLRA and Undocumented Workers
immigration status. 22 The Court agreed with the Board that undocumented
23
workers should be considered employees for purposes of the NLRA.
However, the Court determined that when an undocumented discriminatee
has left the United States, his or her status should bear on NLRB consideration of how to remedy the unfair labor practices perpetrated against that
discriminatee.2 4
Citing Southern Steamship, the Court stated that Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) concerns are among those which the Board has a duty
to accommodate in fashioning remedies.2 Nonetheless, like Southern
Steamship, Sure-Tan offers little guidance to the Board as to the weight it

should give non-NLRA concerns when pursuit of those concerns conflicts
with NLRA objectives. The Sure-Tan Court merely held that proper accommodation of INA objectives precluded the Board from awarding backpay to
discriminatees who had been outside the country and physically unavaila26
ble for work after their discharge.
C.

The Local 512 Decision

In Local 512, 27 the Ninth Circuit considered an NLRB petition to
enforce a conditional backpay award the Board had ordered. 28 The Board
had awarded backpay after finding an employer, Felbro, had committed
22. The Sure-Tan Court rejected the Court of Appeals' order on two grounds. First, the Court stated
that the order represented an impermissible substitution of the court's judgment for that of the Board
regarding how to best remedy unfair labor practices. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 899. The Board had awarded
backpay only afterbeing ordered on remand to do so by the Court ofAppeals. Id. Second, the Court found
the Court of Appeals' remedy inappropriate because it focused on speculative rather than actual harm
suffered by the discriminatees-backpay was computed on the basis of how long the discriminatees
would have remained on thejob ifnot for their improperdischarge. Id. at900-01. At the time of the award,
the discriminatees were apparently in Mexico. Id. at 887.
23. Id. at 891-92.
24. Id. at 902-03. When the discriminatees left the United States, they became unavailable forwork.
A backpay award to a discriminatee who has not remained available for work would compensate the
discriminatee for wages not actually lost because of an unlawful discharge. The theory is that it is the
discriminatee's unavailability for work, not the discharge, which has caused the lost wages. Id.
The Court did state that in computing backpay on remand, "the employees must be deemed 'unavailable' for work (and the accrual of backpay therefore tolled) during any period when they were not lawfully
entitled to be present and working in the United States." Id. at 903. The Court's holding, however, appears
limited. The Court rejected the manner in which the backpay was awarded, not the fact ofa backpay award
to undocumented workers in itself. The Court indicated that under different circumstances such an award
would be appropriate. Id. at 901 n. 11.
25. Id. at 903.
26. Id. at 903-04. Four Justices would have enforced the Board's backpay award in spite of the
discriminatees' absence from the country. Id. at 910 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Justice Brennan suggested that discriminatees that have become unavailable for work because of the
employer's unlawful conduct, should not be considered unavailable for remedial purposes. Id.
27. 795 F.2d 705(9th Cir. 1986).
28. Felbro, Inc., 274N.L.R.B. 1268(1985).
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certain unfair labor practices. 29 The Board determined that backpay could
be awarded on the condition that the discriminatees prove their legal
entitlement to work in the United States. 30 Local 512 petitioned for review
31
of the conditional aspect of the Board's remedy.
The Board had issued its order after reviewing an Administrative Law
Judge's (ALJ) order. 32 The ALJ had disregarded the legal status of Felbro
employees appearing before him, although he noted that several of the
discriminatees were apparently undocumented aliens. 33 After finding that
Felbro had committed unfair labor practices, the ALJ awarded backpay to
those employees discriminated against through improper layoffs. 34 He also
ordered retroactive implementation of the collective bargaining agreement
that Felbro had refused to execute and he ordered that Felbro cease and
35
desist from like conduct in the future.
The Board amended the ALJ's backpay award. 36 The Board interpreted
Sure-Tan as permitting backpay awards only to those lawfully entitled to
work in the United States. 37 It stated that because several employees
affected by the backpay order were apparently undocumented workers, the
determination of those employees' entitlement to backpay should be left to
the compliance stage. 38 Accordingly, the Board would not have awarded
backpay unless a discriminatee was able to prove legal entitlement to work
in the United States.
In Local 512, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the Board's
approach to the backpay issue. 39 The court began its review of the Board's
29. Specifically, Felbro had committed violations ofsection 8(a)(3), (a)(5) ofthe NLRA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3), (a)(5) (1982), by improperly laying off workers and refusing to execute a collective bargaining agreement negotiated with Local 512. Local512, 795 F.2d at 709.

30.

795F.2dat7lO.

31.

Id.

32.

Id. at709.

33. Id. at 710. Throughout the proceedings before him, the AU permitted employees to testify under
assumed names and to refuse to answer questions about their residency status.
34. Id.
35. Id. The ALJ did not need to order reinstatement since Felbro had reinstated the affected em-

ployees before the administrative hearing. Id.
36.

Id. The Board otherwise left the AU's remedial order intact.

37.
38.

Id.
Id. The compliance stage of an NLRB proceeding may be likened to the damages stage of a

bifurcated civil action. This stage occurs after the Board has already adjudged an employer liable for
having committed unfair labor practices. Determinations such as the exact amount of backpay owed are
appropriately made at the compliance stage. See NLRB v. Trident Seafood Corp., 642 F.2d 1148, 1150
(9th Cir. 1981).
39. As a standard of review, the court stated that an NLRB order should be enforced "if it correctly
applies the law and its factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole."
Local 512, 795 F.2d at 710 (emphasis in original); see Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474

(1951).
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order by distinguishing Sure-Tan. The court interpreted Sure-Tan as permitting the Board to award backpay to undocumented workers, at least so
long as they remained in the United States. 40 The court noted that, unlike
the Sure-Tan discriminatees, there was no record the Felbro discriminatees
had ever been the subjects of INS deportation proceedings or actually
unavailable for work. 4 1 Accordingly, the court found that Sure-Tan presented no obstacle to an award of backpay to undocumented workers who
remain in the United States and who have not been the subjects of INS
deportation proceedings. 42
Next, the court considered whether a backpay award would be consistent
with NLRA objectives. 43 The court stated that the Board's proposed order
would permit employers to disregard labor laws with regard to undocumented workers because the employers would incur no backpay liability for
improperly discharging them. 44 Further, the court stated that all workers,
not just undocumented workers, would suffer from an order denying
backpay liability. The court suggested that some employers would be
encouraged to hire undocumented aliens because of the competitive advantage gained by hiring workers relatively unprotected by the NLRA. 45
Accordingly, the court found that a backpay award to the Felbro discriminatees would serve NLRA goals by promoting the collective bargaining
46
process.
The court then found that a backpay award would not conflict with the
INA's objectives since the INA is only "peripheral[ly]" concerned with the
employment of undocumented workers. 47 It stated that the INA did not
prohibit an employer from hiring an undocumented alien nor did it prohibit
an undocumented alien from accepting employment after entering the
country illegally.48 The court recognized that the INA was more concerned
40. Local512, 795 F2d at717.
41. Id.
42. Id. Because the Felbro discriminatees had already been reinstated, the Local 512 court did not
have to speculate as to the actual harm suffered by them. Id. The amount ofwages lost was easily calculable since the discriminatees had missed an identifiable number of days of work due to the lay-offs. Id.
Thus, the Local512court did not face the issue of a speculative award, see supra note 22, which the SureTan Court considered a major obstacle to the backpay award sought therein. Local512, 795 F.2d at 717.
43. Local512, 795 F.2dat717-19.
44. Id. at 719.
45. Id.

46.

Id.

47. Id.
48. Id. In fact, although 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1982) made harboring an undocumented alien unlawful, that section specifically excluded employment from the definition of harboring. The exclusion of
employment of undocumented aliens from the scope of unlawful conduct is, of course, changed by the
IRCA.
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with the terms and conditions of admission into the United States and the
49
treatment of documented aliens already in the country.
Further, the court found that NLRA protection of undocumented workers might actually serve the INA objectives of protecting American workers' jobs, wage rates, and working conditions. 50 The court suggested
NLRA protection of undocumented workers might serve these goals by
lessening any economic advantage gained by hiring undocumented aliens. 5 1 A corresponding increase in job opportunities for American workers should result.52
Finally, the court suggested that the NLRB should not inquire into a
worker's status in any event because "determining alien status is a matter
peculiarly within the expertise of the INS." 53 NLRB officials have no
authority to make such a determination. 54 Accordingly, the court found that
the INA did not prohibit a backpay award to the Felbro discriminatees, and
55
it ordered the Board to make that award with no conditions attached.
D.

Employer Sanctions Provisions of the IRCA

The Local 512 court supported its backpay award to undocumented
workers by stating that the employment of undocumented aliens already in
the United States was a "peripheral" concern of the INA since such
employment was not prohibited by the INA. 56 However, the recently
enacted IRCA now makes such employment unlawful and imposes sanctions on employers who knowingly hire undocumented aliens. 57 Under the
49. Local512, 795 F.2d at 719; seealsoDeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351,360(1976).Thecourt found
it unlikely that a backpay award to undocumented workers already in the country would impinge on this
concern by encouraging illegal entry or reentry. Local512, 795 F.2d at 720. In fact, the court suggested
that to the extent that affording undocumented workers protection under the NLRA would deter employers from hiring illegal aliens, there could be a corresponding reduction in illegal entry into the United
States because the market for illegal labor might be lessened. Id.
50. 795 F.2d at 710.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Bevies Co. v. Local 986, 791 F2d 1391, 1393 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986) (NLRB determination of
INA issues entitled to no deference).
55. Judge Beezer dissented from the majority in Local512 on the basis that the majority construed
Sure-Tan too narrowly. 795 F.2d at 722 (Beezer, J., dissenting). He read Sure-Tan as requiring that those
seeking backpay under the NLRA first establish their legal entitlement to be present and working in the
United States. Id. at 725. He found that an undocumented worker should not be awarded individual relief
since he or she had no right to employment in the first place. Id. Finally, Judge Beezer suggested that
permitting backpay awards to undocumented workers effectively sanctions their continued violation of
the INA by their very presence in the United States. Id. at 726.
56. See supratext accompanying notes 47-48.
57. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 101,100 Stat. 3358,3360
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IRCA, an affirmative defense to a charge of unlawful employment of an
unauthorized alien is that the employer, in good faith, verified the status of
the employee at the time of hiring.58 The IRCA does not impose a duty on
the employer to continually check into the residency status of its employees. 59 However, it is unlawful for an employer to continue to employ a
person if, after hiring, the employer discovers that person is not authorized
to work in the United States. 60 These provisions bring into question
whether NLRA protection of undocumented workers, like the protection
ordered in Local 512, is permissible since those workers should not be
employed according to the IRCA.
II.

ANALYSIS

The Local 512 court ordered a backpay award after weighing NLRA and
INA objectives. The court determined that the objectives of both acts would
be served by permitting the NLRB to award backpay to undocumented
61
discriminatees who remain in the United States and available for work.
By discussing INA objectives, the Local 512 court implicitly recognized
that the Board has a duty to accommodate INA concerns. 62 The court,
(1986) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324A) reads:
(a)(1) It is unlawful for a person or other entity to hire, or to recruit for a fee, for employment in the
United States(A) an alien knowing the alien is an unauthorized alien. . . with respect to such employment, or
(3) an individual without complying with the requirements of subsection (b). [Subsection (b) prescribes a procedure for verifying authorization to work in the United States].
Immigration Reform and Control Act § 101(e)(4) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324A(e)(4)) imposes
civil penalties on employers who knowingly hire undocumented aliens. Section 101(f) (tobe codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1324A(f)) imposes criminal penalties on employers who demonstrate a pattern of knowingly
hiring undocumented aliens.
58. Id. § 101(b) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324A(b)). Satisfaction of § 101(b)'s verification requirement imposes a rather minimal burden on an employer. For instance, an employer satisfies its
verification requirement by attesting, on a form supplied by the Attorney General, that it verified an
employee's legal status by examining a social security card and a driver's license with a photograph
belonging to the employee and that those documents appeared to be genuine.
59. A "continuing verification obligation" is not intended. H.R. REP. No. 1,000, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 57 (1986), reprintedin IOC U.S. CODE CONG. &ADMIN. NEws 5649,5661(1986).
60. Immigration Reform and Control Act § 101(a)(2) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324A(a)(2))
reads:
It is unlawful for a person or other entity, after hiring an alien for employment in accordance with
paragraph (I), to continue to employ the alien in the United States knowing the alien is (or has
become) an unauthorized alien with respect to such employment.
This provision on its face does not impose a duty on an employer discovering an employee to be an
unauthorized alien to report that employee to the INS. The employer's only apparent duty would be to
discharge the employee.
61. See supranotes 43-52 and accompanying text.
62. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
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however, set out no guidelines regarding how the Board should accommo63
date immigration objectives when they conflict with NLRB objectives.
The court may not have set out any guidelines because it determined that
awarding the Felbro discriminatees backpay presented no conflict between
NLRA and INA objectives. The Board nevertheless would benefit from
guidelines regarding its duty to accommodate non-NLRA objectives.
These guidelines should take the form of a precise methodology. Providing
the Board with a precise methodology would enable it to satisfy its duty to
accommodate competing statutory schemes in a reasoned and consistent
manner. Such a methodology is proposed below. A discussion of how this
methodology would guide Board accommodation of IRCA objectives
follows.
A.

A ProposedMethodology for NLRB Accommodation of Non-NLRA
Objectives

The Board's first task in any NLRA remedy determination should be to
consider what remedy would most promote NLRA objectives. A remedial
order may not stand unless it effectuates NLRA policies. 64 Non-NLRA
concerns should be ignored in this initial determination. Requiring that the
Board pursue its own mission before considering non-NLRA objectives
will ensure that Board remedies are principally geared toward effectuating
NLRA policies.
If it is clear to the Board that enforcement of its proposed remedy would
necessarily compel a violation of a specific provision of a competing
statutory scheme, the Board should devise a different remedy. 65 But, the
Board must be able to readily ascertain that such a violation would occur
without making an involved factual determination or any inquiry into the
policies underlying the competing statutory scheme. For instance, the
Board should not unconditionally order reinstatement of an unlawfully
discharged truck driver to a truck driving job if the truck driver does not
have a driver's license. 66 The illegality of driving without a license is easily
ascertainable and determining compliance with the license requirement
involves only a simple factual inquiry. This inquiry would not require the
Board to examine the policies underlying the license requirement nor
63. The court would have had little to draw from in setting out accommodation guidelines since the
Supreme Court has not set out any such guidelines. Both the Southern Steamship and the Sure-Tan Courts
recognized the Board's duty to accommodate non-NLRA objectives but neither precisely defined that
duty. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
64. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
66. A reinstatement order conditioned on the driver obtaining a license, together with a backpay
award, might be appropriate.
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would it require the Board to balance the license policies against NLRA
policies to determine which merit priority.
If enforcement of the proposed remedy would not compel a violation of a
particular provision of another statutory scheme, the Board should order
that remedy. This result should prevail even if enforcement of the remedy
would contravene the general policies underlying the competing scheme.
Accordingly, the Board's duty to accommodate non-NLRA objectives may
be characterized as a negative rather than an affirmative duty: the Board has
no duty to accommodate non-NLRA objectives unless, on the basis of the
facts before it, the Board can readily ascertain that the contemplated action
would compel a specific violation of a non-NLRA statutory scheme. The
goal is to preclude the Board from inquiring into another agency's policy
67
objectives with regard to the discriminatee.
The Board's duty to accommodate non-NLRA objectives should be
limited to a requirement that the Board avoid compelling violations of
specific provisions of non-NLRA statutory schemes for five reasons. First,
the Board's duty to accommodate competing statutory objectives should be
narrowly construed so that the Board can effectively pursue its own
objectives. The Board is charged with discouraging unfair labor practices
and courts have accorded the Board broad authority to deal with those
practices. 68 Second, the Board is not charged with enforcing another
agency's mission. 69 Third, the Board has no expertise in any field but
labor. 70 The Board is not equipped to determine what action would best
71
promote the policies underlying a statutory scheme other than the NLRA.
Fourth, the Board is not the proper body to determine which statutory
scheme should be given preference when statutory objectives conflict. This
task is best left to Congress or the judiciary. Finally, a duty of accommodation that precludes the Board from inquiring into non-NLRA policy objectives is easy for the Board to apply.
B.

NLRB Accommodation of IRCA Objectives

The methodology proposed for ascertaining the Board's duty of accommodation would guide the Board in a remedy determination when faced
67. The Board stated in Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 211 N.L.R.B. 138,139 (1974), "We do not
disagree substantially with the view that we should not undertake the enforcement of statutes which
Congress has given to other agencies to administer." See alsoLocal 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v.
NLRB, 357 U.S. 93,111 (1958).
68. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
69. Local 1976, United Bhd. ofCarpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93,110-11 (1958);seealsoLocal512
v.NLRB, 795 F.2d 705, 721-22 (9th Cir. 1986).
70. NLRB v. ApolloTire Co., Inc., 604 F.2d 1180,1183 (9th Cir. 1979).
71. Local1976, 357 U.S. at 110-11; see alsoLoca1512,795 F.2d at 721-22.
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with conflicting IRCA and NLRA policies. 72 Under this methodology, the
Board's first task would be to determine the appropriate remedy for an
unlawfully discharged employee. The Board should focus solely on the
remedy that would best promote the collective bargaining process or
otherwise effectuate NLRA policies. 73 Because the collective bargaining
process generally is promoted by reinstatement and backpay awards to any
unfairly discharged worker, regardless of status, the discriminatee's immigration status and IRCA concerns should have no bearing on this determination. 74 The potential for a reinstatement and backpay order deters
employers from committing unfair labor practices and encourages employees to report such practices. 75 A blanket prohibition of reinstatement
and backpay awards to undocumented discriminatees would seriously
undermine NLRA objectives by encouraging employers to hire workers
with no effective protection from or impetus to report unfair labor practices. 76 Thus, in terms of promoting NLRA objectives, the Board should
not consider a discriminatee's immigration status in a remedy determination.

77

The Board would next consider whether awarding reinstatement and
backpay would violate any specific IRCA provision. The Board should not
undertake this determination unless an employer claims that a particular
remedy would compel an IRCA violation. 78 A backpay award could not
72. Undocumented workers will undoubtedly remain in the workforce and continue to be hired in
spite of the IRCA employer sanctions provisions. The INS will likely face difficulties such as
inadequate funding and employer resistance, among others, in enforcing the new Act. Accordingly. the
NLRB is likely to continue to be presented with claims involving unfair labor practices committed
against undocumented workers.
73. See supra text accompanying note 64.
74. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177,195 (1941).
75. Local512, 795 F.2d at 718.
76. Id. at 719. The prospect of an award of reinstatement and backpay undoubtedly provides the
strongest impetus for an individual discriminatee to pursue an unfair labor practices complaint before the
NLRB. This is particularly so for an undocumented worker who might have a heightened fear of officials
and agencies because of his or her immigration status. Without a compelling reason to challenge an
employer's unfair labor practices, undocumented workers would become readily exploitable by employers. Id.
If undocumented workers were denied NLRA protections, the collective bargaining process would be
severely injured. Undocumented workers are increasingly unionizing and represent an ever-larger percentage of the American union labor force. Bracamonte, The NationalLaborRelationsAct and Undocumented Workers: The De-Alienization of American Labor, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 29, 34-35 (1983).
Accordingly, continued union vitality may well depend on the unionization of undocumented workers.
With no prospect of effective protection by unions, undocumented workers would have little reason to
unionize.
77. If the Local512 court had followed the procedure outlined above for accommodating non-NLRA
objectives, its inquiry would have stopped after this initial consideration since no specific violation of the
INA was alleged therein. Again, IRCA concerns were not addressed by the court since that Act had not yet
been enacted. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
78. The legislative history of the IRCA indicates that the Act was not intended to eviscerate NLRA
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compel an IRCA violation. 7 9 However, a reinstatement order could violate
the IRCA's prohibition of the knowing employment of unauthorized aliens
if an employer asserts that the discriminatee is an unauthorized alien. 80
An employer's claim that reinstatement would violate the IRCA would
present a difficult choice to the Board. 8 1It could either permit the employer
to use a self-serving and possibly pretextual claim to avoid a reinstatement
82 Faced with this choice, the
order, or order an act which might be illegal.
83
Board would have two reasonable options.
The Board's first option would be to simply ignore the employer's claim
and order reinstatement. At least four considerations support such action.
First, ordering reinstatement in this situation would not compel a readily
ascertainable violation of the IRCA because the Board is not authorized or
equipped to determine the accuracy of the employer's claim. 8 4 Only the
protections for undocumented aliens:
It is not the intention of the Committee that the employer sanctions provisions of the bill be used to
undermine ordiminish in any way laborprotections inexisting law, orto limitthepowers of federal or
state labor relations boards, labor standards agencies, orlabor arbitrators to remedy unfairpractices
committed against undocumented employees for exericising [sic] their rights before such agencies
or for engaging in activities protected by existing law. In particular, the employer sanctions provisions are not intened [sic) to limit in any way the scope ofthe term "employee" in Section 2(3) of the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), as amended, or of the rights and protections stated in Sections 7 and 8 ofthat Act. As the Supreme Court observed in Sure-TanInc.v. NLRB .... application
of the NLRA "helps to assure that the wages and employment conditions of lawful residents are not
adversely affected by the competition of illegal alien employees who are not subject to the standard
terms of employment."
H.R. RP,. No. 1,000, 99thCong.,2dSess. 58 (1986),reprintedatIOCU.S. CODECONG. &ADMIN. NEws
5649, 5662 (1986), citing 467 U.S. 883,893 (1984).
79. PertinentprovisionsoftheImmigrationReformandControlActare§§ 101-103 (to be codified at
8U.S.C. §§ 1324A-1326).
80. Of course, Sure-Tan's prohibition ofreinstatement or backpay awards to discriminatees outside
the United States remains unaffected by the IRCA's enactment.
81. Such a claim would likely be raised at the NLRB hearing investigating the employer's alleged
unfair labor practices. To preclude admission ofan IRCA violation, the employer would likely claim that
it learned of the discriminatee's illegal status after his or her discharge.
82. In reality, few employers would be likely to make this claim since it would be made at the risk of
attracting INS attention to eitherpastemployment of unauthorized aliens orpossible presentemployment
of unauthorized aliens.
83. A third option would be to order reinstatement contingent on an INS determination that the
discriminatee is entitled to work in the United States. Following this procedure would likely deterpretextual claims because no employer is apt to want two administrative bodies inquiring into its employment
practices, especially if thosepractices have involvedunlawful conduct. However, undocumented workers
would also undoubtedly be deterred from reporting unfair labor practices committed against them to the
NLRB. Undocumented workers are unlikely to participate in an unfairlaborpractices investigationif INS
involvement is likely. TheLocal512court stated "the knowledge that deportationproceedings are a likely
consequence of filing a successful unfair labor practice charge would chill severely the inclination of any
unlawfully treated undocumented worker to vindicate his or her rights before the NLRB." Local 512 v.
NLRB, 795 F.2d 705, 719 (9th Cir. 1986). For this reason, this third option is not attractive.
84. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text. Of course, if the Board were presented with a
deportation order regarding a particular discriminatee, the accuracy of the employer's claim would be
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INS or the Attorney General may appropriately make this determination. 85
Second, the IRCA's legislative history indicates that the employer sanctions provisions of the Act should not be construed to limit the NLRB's
power to remedy unfair labor practices committed against undocumented
workers. 86 Third, ignoring an employer's claim that a discriminatee is
unauthorized to work would preclude an employer from benefitting by
making a pretextual claim. Finally, since the employer would be the only
party harmed by reinstatement, fairness would prevail. It is the employer's
unlawful conduct in the first place that got the employer into the position of
possible liability under two statutory schemes. 87
Alternatively, to avoid any possibility of compelling a violation of the
IRCA, the Board could accept the employer's claim and decline to order
reinstatement. The Board's task would then be to fashion a remedy that
most nearly makes the discriminatee whole without reinstatement. A
backpay award with interest covering the time from discharge to the time of
the employer's claim before the Board of the discriminatee's illegal status
would be a minimum remedy.88
The Board would avoid a direct conflict with the IRCA by following this
latter course. Employers would be encouraged, however, to assert pretextual claims that discriminatees are unauthorized aliens. Labor objectives
apparent and the Board would be precluded from ordering reinstatement. In that situation, it would be
clear that the discriminatee is not authorized to work in the United States and that enforcement of a
reinstatement order would compel a violation of the employer sanctions provisions of the IRCA. Nonetheless, as long as a discriminatee remains in the United States and has not been ordered deported, the
Board could not readily ascertain that a reinstatement order would compel a violation of the IRCA's
prohibition of the knowing employment of unauthorized aliens.
85. Local512, 795 F.2d at 721. The Board, however, could properly conduct a minimal inquiry into
the discriminatee's status to assess the validity of the employer's claim. Thus, the Board could request the
discriminatee to show papers which satisfy the IRCA verification scheme. See supranote 58 and accompanying text. Failure to be able to meet this threshold burden could properly preclude a discriminatee's
reinstatement.
86. See supra note 78.
87. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Int'l Union ofUnited Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
In W.R. Grace, the Court enforced an arbitrator's award of backpay to two employees who had been
discharged in violation of the seniority provisions ofthe existing collective bargaining agreement with the
employer. The employer discharged those employees in orderto uphold a conciliatory agreement reached
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission aimed at rectifying past discrimination against
women. The Court upheld the award, stating that the employerhad "cornered [itself] by its own actions."
Id. at 770.
88. If the Board were to take this option, it should inquire into the circumstances of the employer's
alleged discovery of the discriminatee's undocumented status. If it is apparent that the employer investigated the discriminatee's status after commencement of the Board's investigation into the employer's
unfair labor practice, the Board could appropriately find an additional unfair labor practice on the employer's part. It is an unfair labor practice to pursue an employee's deportation in order to avoid compliance with an NLRB remedial order. Sure-Tan v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 895-96 (1984). If the Board
found such an unfair labor practice, it could enter a cease and desist order.
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would correspondingly suffer. 89 Because the Board's primary task is to
effectuate NLRA objectives and not to enforce another agency's mission,
the Board should be permitted to order a discriminatee's reinstatement
unless that discriminatee has left the country or has been ordered deported. 90 Requiring that the Board deny reinstatement because such an
order might compel a violation of the IRCA would be inconsistent with the
wide latitude the Board has been granted to deal with unfair labor practices. 9 1
Finally, if the Board determines that a desired remedial award is appropriate under the NLRA and would not compel a specific violation of the
IRCA, the Board's inquiry should cease and it should order that remedy.
The Local512 court undertook an extensive examination of INA policies in
justifying the backpay award it ordered. 92 The Board should not be required
to examine immigration policies since the Board is not equipped to consider the policies underlying non-NLRA statutory schemes and such exam93
ination would interfere with the Board's pursuit of its own objectives.
Board action consistent with this proposal would assure the widest latitude
for pursuit of NLRA objectives while giving sufficient consideration to
immigration concerns.
I.

THE WISDOM OF NLRA PROTECTION FOR
UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS

In determining whether an individual discriminatee, alleged to be an
undocumented alien, is entitled to reinstatement and backpay under the
NLRA, the NLRB need only undertake the inquiry outlined above. Thus,
from a purely procedural stance, policy considerations regarding the
wisdom of NLRA protections for undocumented workers need not concern
the Board. Nevertheless, courts may have to weigh competing policy
interests in reviewing a future Board award of reinstatement and backpay to
an undocumented worker. Undoubtedly, an employer appealing a future
89. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 80, 84 and accompanying text.
91. Whatever the Board's choice of remedy when faced with an employer's claim that reinstatement
would compel violation of the IRCA's employer sanctions provisions, that remedy must be designed to
encourage undocumented workers to pursue unfair labor practices claims before the Board. Effective
enforcement of labor laws depends initially on unfair labor practices being reported. Thus, a discriminatee should be assured that at least a backpay award will result from pursuing a successful unfair labor
practices claim involving the discriminatee's discharge and that the INS will not become involved in the
Board's remedy determination.
92. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
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Board order awarding reinstatement and backpay is likely to assert the
award manifests bad policy, regardless of any procedural advantages that
might be gained by permitting the Board to make such an award. Therefore,
this Comment examines the wisdom of NLRA protection for undocumented workers from a general policy perspective.
The court in Local 512 suggested that NLRA protection of undocumented workers does not conflict with immigration objectives. 94 Nonetheless, the analysis of the consistency between NLRA protection of undocumented workers and INA concerns has changed with the enactment of the
IRCA. The new Act clearly prohibits the knowing employment of undocumented aliens. 95 Accordingly, the INS might view NLRB protection of
undocumented workers' employment rights as discordant with IRCA policies.
In spite of the IRCA's provisions, however, Local 512's assertion that
NLRA protection of undocumented workers would serve general INS
concerns still has merit. Specifically, the court suggested that affording
labor law protections to undocumented workers reduces the desirability of
employing them and should, by correspondingly reducing the market for
their labor, diminish the impetus to cross the border illegally. 96 NLRA
protection of undocumented workers should act together with the employer
sanctions provisions of the IRCA to deter employers from knowingly hiring
undocumented aliens. 97 Immigration concerns would accordingly be fur98
thered.
NLRA protection of undocumented workers should also be considered
good policy because immigration status has been disregarded in other
contexts. For instance, in Ayala v. California Unemployment Insurance
Appeals Board,99 the court disregarded immigration status in upholding an
award of unemployment compensation to an undocumented alien claimant.
Similarly, the court in Perez v. Health & Social Services'I° held that an
undocumented alien was entitled to medical benefits under a wholly state
sponsored plan. In Hagl v. JacobStern & Sons, Inc., 10 1the court held that
94. Local512 v. NLRB. 795 F.2d 705, 719-22 (9th Cir. 1986).
95. See supra notes 57, 60 and accompanying text.
96. Local512, 795 F.2d at 719.
97. An estoppel notion might also be pertinent here-an employer should not gain immunity from
NLRA restrictions in the workplace because he or she illegally employed an unauthorized alien. An
employer should not be permitted to avoid liability for one wrong by commission of another. See W.R.
Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757,770 (1983).
98. The consistency between the employer sanctions provisions of the IRCA and NLRA protection
of undocumented workers is indicated by the statement in the previously cited House Report that nothing
in the IRCA is meant to weaken the NLRB's authority to remedy unfair laborpractices. See supranote 78.
99. 54Cal. App. 3d676, 126Cal. Rptr. 210(1976).
100. 573 P.2d 689 (N.M. App. 1977), cert. denied, 576 P.2d 297 (N.M. 1978).
101. 396F.Supp.779(E.D.Pa. 1975).
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an undocumented alien has standing to sue in a federal court and that illegal
status should not preclude a claim for damages for lost future wages.
Additionally, in Alvarez v. Sanchez,' 0 2 the court determined that an undocumented alien may recover under the Fair Labor Standards Act for
underpayment and nonpayment of wages. Finally, in Plyler v. Doe,103 the
Supreme Court found that undocumented aliens are guaranteed due process
of law through the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 104
A further reason to permit NLRA protection of undocumented workers
is that a violation of NLRA provisions is no less egregious than a violation
of immigration laws. Prosecution of unfair labor practices claims is undertaken in the public interest; the aim of such prosecution is not the vindication of private rights. 105 Accordingly, prosecuting and remedying unfair
labor practices is just as important as enforcement of the immigration laws.
Pursuit of labor policy should not be subordinated to that of immigration
whenever the two policies conflict.
Finally, NLRA protection of undocumented workers is good policy
because, without such protection, an already weak and readily exploitable
segment of the American workforce would be left without any formal
means of correcting abuses in the workplace committed against its members. 106 Failure to provide undocumented workers protection in the workplace could result in an underclass of workers with little stake in the
common good. 107 Basic notions of an ordered, egalitarian society would
08
seem to require more. 1
IV.

CONCLUSION

The NLRB has a duty to accommodate IRCA objectives when it issues
orders remedying unfair labor practices. The Board would satisfy this duty
if, before issuing an order, it first ascertains what remedy would best
effectuate NLRA policies and does not modify that remedy unless it would
compel a violation of a particular IRCA provision. Accordingly, when an
undocumented discriminatee remains in the United States after discharge,
the Board may disregard the IRCA unless the employer charged with unfair
102. 105 A.D.2d 1114, 482N.Y.S.2d 184(1984).
103. 457 U.S. 202(1982).
104. The Court did state, however, that "undocumented status is not irrelevant to any proper legislative goal." Id. at 220.
105. Felbro, Inc., 274N.L.R.B. 1268, 1272n.6. (1985).
106. Sure-Tan v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883,892 (1984).
107. Lichtenberg, Within the Pale:Aliens, IllegalAliens, andEqualProtection,44 U. Prrr. L. REv.
351,373 (1983).
108. Kutchins &Tweedy, No Two WaysAboutlt:EmployerSanctionsVersusLaborLawProtections
for UndocumentedWorkers, 5 INDus. RE. L.J. 339,368-69 (1983).
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labor practices claims that reinstatement would compel violation of the
IRCA's prohibition against the knowing employment of unauthorized
aliens. If the INS has determined the discriminatee to be deportable, the
Board should not order reinstatement. In the absence of such a determination, however, the employee's status should not bear on the Board's determination of the discriminatee's entitlement to reinstatement or any other
remedial award. This narrow interpretation of the NLRB's duty to accommodate IRCA objectives would further NLRA objectives by giving undocumented workers a stake in the collective bargaining process and
thereby promote that process. A narrow interpretation would also do much
to prevent the abuse of undocumented workers, who represent a significant
and growing segment of the American work force.
DanielR. Fjelstad

